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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2043
________________
DANIEL WESLEY,
            Appellant
      v.
DIRECTOR DOCTOR BRUCE DIXON, Allegheny County
Correctional Health Service Inc.; JAIL PHYSICIAN
DOCTOR PATTERSON, Allegheny Correctional Services
Inc. Defendants sued in the professional and individual
capacity; ALLEGHENY CO. JAIL
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 04-cv-00084)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas M. Hardiman
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 21, 2006
Before:   FUENTES, VAN ANTWERPEN AND CHAGARES, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed October 4, 2006)
_______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
2PER CURIAM
Daniel Wesley appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint for
failure to prosecute.  In January 2004, Wesley filed a civil rights complaint in which he
alleged that two doctors at the Allegheny County Jail were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs because they refused to provide him with surgery to remove his bowel bag
and reattach his intestines because it would be too expensive.  In March 2004, the District
Court granted Wesley’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.  In March 2005, the
Magistrate Judge ordered the U.S. Marshal to mail the complaint and request for waiver
of service to the defendants.  On May 13, 2005, the Marshal filed notices of inability to
serve the complaint on the three named defendants.  On the forms it was noted “returned
to court unexecuted - no response to waiver by mail.”  On May 19, 2005, the Magistrate
Judge ordered that the Clerk prepare a duplicate summons and complaint and that the
U.S. Marshal make personal service on the defendants.  There is nothing in the record to
indicate that personal service was attempted.
On February 1, 2006, the Magistrate Judge ordered Wesley to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution.  The Magistrate Judge noted that
Wesley had been released from jail and had not advised the court of any change of
address.  The Magistrate Judge stated that Wesley had been informed that the failure to
advise the District Court of an address change could result in the dismissal of his case for
     1 The show cause order was returned to the court with the envelope marked “resident
released.”
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failure to prosecute.  Wesley did not respond1 and the District Court entered an order
dismissing the action on February 28, 2006.  On March 23, 2006, Wesley filed a timely
notice of appeal.  He has also filed a motion for the appointment of counsel.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s
order dismissing the action for failure to prosecute for an abuse of discretion.  Redmond
v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801 (3d Cir. 2003); Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d
863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  “Dismissals with prejudice or defaults are drastic sanctions,
termed ‘extreme’ by the Supreme Court, and are to be reserved for comparable cases.” 
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867-8 (citation omitted).  In Poulis, we set forth six factors to be
balanced in deciding whether to dismiss a case as a sanction: 
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to
discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the
attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Id. at 868 (emphasis omitted).  In determining whether the District Court has abused its
discretion, we examine its balancing of these factors and whether its findings are
supported by the record.  Here, the District Court did not address or weigh the Poulis
factors.
With respect to the first Poulis factor, because Wesley is proceeding pro se, he
     2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2) provides that “[a]t the request of the plaintiff,
. . . the court may direct that service be effected by a United States marshal, deputy
United States marshal, or other person or officer specially appointed by the court for that
purpose.  Such an appointment must be made when the plaintiff is authorized to proceed
in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”
4
bears full responsibility for the litigation.  However, as noted above, the District Court
had ordered the Clerk to prepare duplicate summons and the Marshal to make personal
service on the defendants.2  Thus, at the time Wesley was ordered to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed, there was nothing for him to do for the prosecution of the
action.  
As for the second Poulis factor, it is not clear whether the defendants will be
prejudiced by any delay.  However, because the delay is not attributable to Wesley, this
factor does not weigh against him.  As the case was in its initial stages, there was no
history of dilatoriness on Wesley’s part.  As for whether the conduct was willful or in bad
faith, there is nothing to indicate that Wesley’s failure to notify the Court of his address
change was anything more than forgetfulness.  With respect to the effectiveness of
alternate sanctions, we believe that there was no need for a sanction in this case. 
Wesley’s allegations state a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs;
he alleged that he was denied necessary medical treatment because of its cost. 
Because the District Court did not weigh the Poulis factors, it abused its discretion
in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute.  We conclude that a balancing of the
Poulis factors does not weigh in favor of dismissal.  Summary action is appropriate if
5there is no substantial question presented in the appeal.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4.  For
the above reasons, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s February 28, 2006 order
and remand the matter to the District Court for service of the complaint on the defendants. 
See Third Circuit I.O.P. 10.6.  Wesley’s motion for the appointment of counsel on appeal
is denied as moot.
